Jack Michael: I admire your efforts (Malott, 2003) in going through the relational-frame book (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche; 2001).
Dick Malott: Thanks. Interesting book, but tough sledding.
J: And your analysis in terms of productive symbolic stimulus control seems quite reasonable.
D: Thanks. As you may recall, these issues have been of interest to me ever since I've been at WMU.
J: However, there were two aspects of the paper I found myself disagreeing with. The first was your characterization in the first paragraph of what "we" would reply, etc. I did not see myself in this characterization. I came at the applied area primarily from extensive study of Skinner's (1953) Hockett (1960a & b) are searching for some critical feature that could be used to distinguish "real" human language from various seemingly linguistic behaviors, such as animals might display naturally or as a result of training by humans, the kinds ofthings you refer to as "pale imitations" of language. 115 (Incidentally, I am not one of the behavior analysts who is unaware of his so-called brilliant work, but one who found it oflittle value in our efforts to understand verbal behavior.)
Skinner's definition of verbal behavior as behavior reinforced through the behavior of another person is only intended to identify the topic ofhis consideration in the book on verbal behaviQr, and the refinements to the definition at the end of chapter 8 (Skinner, 1992) are only to show that the analysis can be narrowed to "what is traditionally recognized as the verbal field," but not to identify an essential feature. The essential features of the mand can be seen in the behavior of the dog that sits by the door because such behavior has been reinforced by being let out. Such verbal behavior has a relatively small vocabulary, and is certainly not deserving of a 470-page behavior analysis like verbal behavior.
It lacks some ofthe more interesting aspects of human language, but not some essential feature that is seen in "real human language." D: The barking-doggie example is an interesting and I think deceptive example. Of course, it is functionally the same as the rat pressing the lever in the Skinner box, with the Psy 360 student delivering a drop of water, contingent on that lever press. And so the rat e.g. is just as classifiable as verbal behavior as is the doggie e.g., but the rat e.g. doesn't have the face validity of the doggie e.g., the doggie e.g. carries with it all sorts of implicit baggage that convinces the unwary, because clearly the doggie is trying to communicate to the master, who, indeed, understands what his little doggie is trying to say. In other words, the naive will buy into the argument that the doggie is talking much more quickly than the rat is talking. Another value of using the higher standard of linguistic productivity is that it might focus research on this more complex behavioral repertoire-the productive repertoire. That could result in better experimental and applied control over the variables responsible for instilling that highly desirable repertoire. J: Also, I am not sure I understand your point about the little non-verbal autistic kid's selfinjury as an attempt to communicate, etc. Aside from the objectionable mentalistic language it may well be important to determine whether the child is "attempting to communicate with the trainer that the task is too difficult" (that is, the bad behavior is related to a reinforcement history of cessation of the training task) or not so related. Self-injurious or aggressive behavior that occurs because of a reinforcement history unrelated to cessation ofthe training task is different in an important way from topographically similar behavior that is related to cessation of the training task, and this difference is not unrelated to appropriate treatment.
D: My point is that using terms like "communicate" causes many people, perhaps most people to do the opposite of the functional analysis you suggest and instead to try to verbally communicate back to the kid, to get him to understand that his disruptive behavior is self-defeating, to get him to see the relation of such behavior to his longterm well being-no kidding. We're talking about a culture that insists on using descriptive praise with non-verbal organisms. And I think "communicate" just fuzzes up that whole scene. The problem with the structural view is that it causes people, including behavior analysts, to make distinctions they should not make and to fail to make distinctions they should make.
An example ofsuperficial, structural distinctions: "Don't tell me that back-ward mental patient's frequent, disruptive entering of the nurses' station is an operant response, maintained by its consequence, just like the rat's lever press. The woman looks nothing like the rat; her entering the nurses' station looks nothing like the lever press; and the negative rejection by the nurses looks nothing like the rat's drop of water."
An example of superficial, structural similarities: "That back-ward mental patient's hoarding of towels in her room looks like the rats pressing the lever and getting drops of water. So it's time for an EO. To stop the rat's pressing the lever, we can satiate him with water. So to stop the woman's hoarding the towels, we can satiate her with towels; we will fill her room with towels." Though the intervention worked, and though filling the woman's room with towels may appear structurally similar to filling the rat's bottle with water, those two events do not serve the same function. You So now if you will excuse me, I will get back to my PowerPoint.
